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Abstract: Human factors contribute to majority of maritime accidents. This study proposes an advanced 10 
methodology for maritime accident prevention strategy formulation from a human factor perspective. It is 11 
conducted by incorporating Bayesian network (BN) and Technique for Order of Preference by Similarity to 12 
Ideal Solution (TOPSIS) in a multi-criteria decision-making system. In order to develop rational accident 13 
prevention strategies, this work integrates Multiple Correspondence Analysis (MCA), Hierarchical Clustering 14 
(HC) and Classification Tree (CT) to generate strategies and describes accident types as criteria for a new 15 
multi-criteria risk-based decision-making system. Specifically, MCA is performed to detect patterns of 16 
contributory factors explaining maritime accident types. It is complemented by HC and a CT, aiming at 17 
creating different classes of vessels. Next, a Bayesian-based TOPSIS model is built to illustrate the features 18 
of multiple criteria and the relations among alternatives (i.e. strategies), so as to select the best-fit strategies 19 
for accident prevention. The results show that the information, clear order, and safety culture are the three 20 
most effective recommendations for maritime accident prevention considering human errors, which presents 21 
new insights for accident prevention practice for maritime authorities.  22 
Keywords: Accident investigation, maritime accidents, human factors, accident prevention, TOPSIS, BN.  23 
 
 
1. Introduction 24 
Maritime accidents may cause loss of human lives, damage to the environment, and loss of economy (Zhang 25 
and Thai, 2016). Most maritime accidents are characterised by low probability but high consequence, which 26 
implies the significance of risk assessment for shipping activities. It is also recognised that organisation, 27 
working condition, and navigational environment are among the major driving forces to maritime accidents 28 
(García-Herrero et al., 2012). Although modern ships have been equipped with advanced technologies, 29 
including e-navigation technology, onboard information, bridge resource management systems, human factors 30 
still reveal a major contribution to maritime accidents.  31 
Generally, the International Maritime Organisation (IMO) focused on human factors much later than the 32 
studies and regulations in other transportation modes such as aviation or railway (Schroder-Hinrichs et al., 33 
2011). The maritime sector initiated the studies on the contribution of human and organisational factors (HOFs) 34 
from the occurrence of the capsizing of the Herald of Free Enterprise in 1987 (Transport, 1987). Since then, 35 
accident investigations pay more attention to human factors in maritime safety. Statistically, human 36 
failures/errors account for approximately 80% of maritime accidents, which play an essential role in terms of 37 
accident prevention (Trucco et al., 2008; Tzannatos, 2010; Fan et al., 2018). Human factors in maritime 38 
accidents are usually associated with other relevant factors, including workplace conditions, physical and 39 
natural environment, procedures, technology, training, organisation, management, as well as individual factors 40 
(e.g. fatigue, task load, mental state) (Psarros, 2015). Human factors are often viewed as causes behind 41 
anything that goes improperly at sea.  42 
IMO advocates accident investigations on a non-mandatory basis by its IMO Code of 1997. Once receiving 43 
 
 
the notification of an accident, maritime administrations may carry out the investigation in order to learn how 44 
safety-critical systems failed and why the specific accident happened (Schroder-Hinrichs et al., 2011). Many 45 
maritime administrations take this opportunity to review regulations, standards and management associated 46 
with technical and non-technical skills related to navigation. To mitigate the risk and improve the safety of 47 
marine transportation, IMO introduced the Formal Safety Assessment (FSA) methodology for its applications 48 
to the rule-making process (IMO, 2002; IMO, 2013). Moreover, the majority of marine accidents or incidents 49 
and hazardous events can be avoided by risk management and countermeasures such as operational procedures 50 
or training (Vander Hoorn and Knapp, 2015).  51 
Generally, accidents are investigated for serving as performance indicators for decision making or policy 52 
making, supporting data for research, dealing with responsibility allocation, or to take a disciplinary action 53 
against crews onboard (Stoop, 2003). It is significant to draw lessons from accidents to prevent reoccurrence 54 
of similar events, incidents, or accidents in the future. Maritime accident prevention strategies have been 55 
proposed to reduce the risk level of navigation. And recommendations from maritime accident investigation 56 
may provide insight into the details of underlying actions or decisions of stakeholders (Stoop, 2003). Only 57 
focusing on better analysis methods for maritime accidents does not contribute to rational recommendations. 58 
Other issues like multi-criteria decision making bring new perspectives on investigations (Liu et al., 2016; 59 
Othman et al., 2015), which reflects adjustments to how factors control over the performance of systems, 60 
rather than analysing single factor that contributes to the causation of accidents.  61 
Some other research works reveal the human factors’ significance in accident prevention accounting for 62 
multiple criteria (Othman et al., 2015; Antão and Guedes Soares, 2019). Human factors have been proposed 63 
 
 
as the main contributor and significant issues to serious maritime accidents. However, the lack of effective 64 
information and poor quality of data restrain the steps of accident investigation in view of human factors. For 65 
example, the databanks for maritime accidents are filled with uncertain records on the situations of accidents. 66 
Furthermore, working on extracting human factors from the accident reports which contain details on the 67 
process of accidents is time consuming. From this point of view, it is necessary to develop a methodology to 68 
incorporate human factors into decision making for effective accident prevention. 69 
A methodology for analysing the human factors and their contribution to maritime accident prevention is 70 
proposed in this paper by incorporating Bayesian Network (BN) and TOPSIS. The rest of the paper is 71 
structured as follows. The literature review on accident investigation and multi-criteria decision-making 72 
systems used for accident prevention is conducted in Section 2. Section 3 demonstrates the methodology of 73 
integrating Multiple Correspondence Analysis (MCA) and Hierarchical Clustering (HC) to generate strategies, 74 
and BN modelling and TOPSIS method to prioritise the generated strategies. In section 4, the detailed data 75 
collection, generation of strategies, and the results of the Bayesian-based TOPSIS model are present and 76 
discussed with illustrative real cases. Finally, Section 5 concludes the paper. 77 
2. Literature review 78 
2.1 Accident investigation in maritime transportation 79 
By the end of the 19th century, it had been required to clarify the responsibility of the events by investigation 80 
of naval disasters. Such investigations were followed by disciplinary actions, focusing on the role of the 81 
captain and officers on board, but did not take organisational, policy and institutional factors into account. 82 
 
 
Then, independent accident investigation agencies were established by law and act as an independent 83 
organisation, avoid the contrary interest with maritime authorities. Besides clarification of the blame, they 84 
focused on understanding what exactly happened by analysing system safety deficiencies. As the growing 85 
interest of the public after serious accidents, they also helped victims and their families come to terms with 86 
their suffering (Stoop, 2003). 87 
There is not lacking of research on how to evaluate recommendations for accident preventions in the literature. 88 
For instance, strategies for dealing with resistance to recommendations derived from Swedish accident 89 
investigators are developed. However, they did not find out how common or widespread the strategies are 90 
(Lundberg et al., 2012). Wan et al. (2019) developed a model to assess risk factors of maritime supply chains 91 
by integrating a fuzzy belief rule approach and Bayesian networks for rational accident prevention. The 92 
investigations on multi-criteria decision making issues emerge for rational recommendations (Liu et al., 2016; 93 
Othman et al., 2015). In addition, research suggested that significant work remained to be done after having 94 
the causations identified. Yang et al. (2018) proposed a Bayesian Network-based approach to analyse risk 95 
factors influencing Port State Control (PSC) inspections and predict the detention probabilities under different 96 
situations. The findings could support port authorities to rationalise their inspection regulations as well as the 97 
allocation of the resources. From this point of view, sorting out recommendations is based on to control the 98 
variables in the Multi Criteria Decision Making (MCDM) systems rather than just explaining the variables 99 
(Stoop, 2003). 100 
Moreover, human factors are significant issues among accident preventions accounting for multiple criteria 101 
(Othman et al., 2015). For instance, Antão and Guedes Soares (2019) suggested to proactively optimise 102 
 
 
accident prevention through the development of specific procedures for fishing vessels and training for 103 
recreation vessels’ crews, and reactively reduce the consequences of occurrence through equipping more life-104 
saving equipment to the areas more prone to specific accidents. However, it revealed limited information 105 
regarding the direct impact of a human error into an occurrence. Othman et al. (2015) introduced TOPSIS 106 
method to maritime accident investigation and found that Senior Deck Cadets (SDC) are the most affected by 107 
distractions during the ship's operation, but did not illustrate the relations among sub-criteria. From this point 108 
of view, it is worth developing a methodology to incorporate human factors into effective accident prevention. 109 
Also, there are several publications focusing on HOFs by analysing accident reports (Schroder-Hinrichs et al., 110 
2011; Macrae, 2009; Uğurlu et al., 2015). Analysing maritime accident reports has been a rational option to 111 
generate insights for accident prevention (Fan et al., 2020). Chauvin et al. (2013) utilised MCA and 112 
hierarchical clustering to reveal three patterns of factors but was restricted by a small number of reports with 113 
a large number of variables. It had been developed as a rational way to explain the causations behind maritime 114 
accidents by statistical analysis. Moreover, it was associated with human factors or human performance into 115 
maritime accident modelling. Sotiralis et al. (2016) developed the BN model integrating elements from the 116 
Technique for Retrospective and Predictive Analysis of Cognitive Errors (TRACEr) and calculated the 117 
collision accident probability. It was applied to assess the collision risk of a feeder operating in Dover strait 118 
due to human error. Through the review of 41 accident investigation reports, Schroder-Hinrichs et al. (2011) 119 
found that organisational factors were not identified by maritime accident investigators to the extent which 120 
the IMO guidelines expected. In addition, Fuzzy Cognitive Map (FCM)-based technique (de Maya et al. 2019) 121 
was applied to generating weight the importance of human factors as prior failure probabilities, which helped 122 
create the BN model. The accident scenario analysis showed that the lack of safety culture contributed the 123 
 
 
most to the system failure.  124 
In general, the maritime sector lacks critical mass in historical accident data to support meaning statistical 125 
analysis of various factors contributing to maritime accidents. Besides, the uncertainty and incompleteness of 126 
database further contributes to the limitation of statistical research, especially in view of human factors. 127 
2.2 Multi-criteria decision-making for accident prevention 128 
MCDM provides decision makers with a comprehensive approach to determine complex, poorly defined 129 
problems with multiple and interrelated criteria. Recommendations based on maritime accident investigation 130 
is in essence a MCDM issue involving reducing the risks of navigation considering frequencies and severities 131 
of different types of accidents, cost, social benefits, and their associations. Generally, some criteria can be 132 
measured numerically, and others cannot, as each criterion may have different units of measurement, quality 133 
characteristics, and weights (Zavadskas et al., 2016). Individually, the decision maker of MCDM problem 134 
ranks alternatives after the qualitative or quantitative analysis of a set of criteria, and find the most desirable 135 
alternative based on the intersection of selected criteria (Yue, 2011).  136 
The MCDM methods provide solutions for a wide range of society, economics, engineering, and management 137 
(Ming et al., 2014; Efe, 2016). MCDM has been applied to many sectors, such as system selection (Sadeghi 138 
et al., 2013), location selection (Keršulienė and Turskis, 2014), technology selection (Ishizaka et al., 2013), 139 
and robot selection (Vahdani et al., 2013; Rashid et al., 2014) . Besides, MCDM has been developed and 140 
applied to the maritime sector, especially for accident prevention. For instance, Hollnagel (2004) developed 141 
barrier functions and modelled barrier systems that will enable informed decisions for system changes for 142 
 
 
accident prevention rather than accident analysis. It was stated that accidents could be prevented through a 143 
combination of multiple criteria, including performance monitoring and barrier functions, rather than through 144 
the elimination of causes, which is a proactive approach. From this point of view, it provided insights for the 145 
recommendations in the cases of accidents and decision making of onboard operations for seafarers. 146 
TOPSIS has been one of most popular methods for solving the MCDM problem, which was initially 147 
designated to solve crisp valuated MCDM problems (Behzadian et al., 2012). Wu et al. (2016) introduced 148 
TOPSIS for final decision-making, integrated with consistency-based linear programming model to obtain the 149 
interval weights of attributes, which provided a practical decision framework for safety control of not under 150 
control ship. Then, Wu et al. (2018) incorporated evidential reasoning and TOPSIS into group decision making 151 
for handling ship without command. Othman et al. (2015) used a TOPSIS method to rank the alternatives in 152 
the order of how they are affected by the psychological problem of distraction. It proved that Senior Deck 153 
Cadets (SDC) are most affected by distractions when they are engaged in the ship's operation.  154 
Due to the advantage of its application in a fuzzy environment, Liu et al. (2016) proposed an extended TOPSIS 155 
model to compare fuzzy numbers with the same expected value and make the fuzzy number with lower 156 
expected value but higher reliability to outperform that with higher expected value but lower reliability. In 157 
addition, the fuzzy TOPSIS approach was applied to sort through alternative solutions to improve port safety 158 
(Özdemir, 2016). In this way, TOPSIS is well known for multi-criteria decision making problems but cannot 159 
represent the relations among alternatives, nor their effects to criterion of interest.  160 
Bayesian Network (BN) has been widely used for risk analysis and accident prevention. Yang et al. (2018) 161 
proposed a Bayesian-based approach to analyse risk factors influencing PSC inspections and simulated 162 
 
 
scenario to illustrate the multiple factors’ influences on vessel detention. It revealed BN’s advantages of 163 
representing causal relationships between variables and predicting the effect of factor changes to the criterion 164 
of interest. However, BN only focuses on single criteria of the system. Although it provides a powerful 165 
decision support tool and predicts properties of safety systems, BN is not applicable for multi-criteria decision 166 
making cases. Combining the merits of BN and TOPSIS, Yang et al. (2009) developed a methodology to 167 
allocate all relevant decision attributes in the form of the nodes in BNs to produce certain associated attribute 168 
values and integrate with TOPSIS to rank a set of options. It was evidence that the BN-based TOPSIS method 169 
was applicable to the MCDM system.  170 
However, there are few studies on the later stages of the accident investigation process focusing on human 171 
factors where recommendations are formulated and assessed. One novelty of this study lies in strengthening 172 
the significance of human factors in accident investigation and generate related strategies to support the 173 
recommendations for accident prevention. That is to say, what risk factors contribute to human errors and how 174 
to formulate strategies from analysing risk factors, are focal points of the study. Besides, research on potential 175 
correlations between alternatives in the maritime domain is scanty. In order to effectively select 176 
countermeasures, another novelty of this study lies in modelling the MCDM problem considering inter-177 
relations among strategies and provide insights for the accident preventions accounting for human errors.  178 
3. Methodology 179 
In order to formulate the maritime accident prevention strategy from human factors perspective, several 180 
approaches have been applied to promote the study. Firstly, the raw database is sorted out from the maritime 181 
accident reports, followed by statistical analysis of contributory factors in maritime accidents. This work 182 
 
 
integrates Multiple Correspondence Analysis (MCA), Hierarchical Clustering (HC) and Classification Tree 183 
(CT) to generate strategies and describes accident types as criteria for a new multi-criteria risk-based decision-184 
making system. Specifically, MCA is performed to detect patterns of contributory factors explaining maritime 185 
accident types. It is complemented by HC and a CT, aiming at creating different classes of vessels. Next, a 186 
Bayesian-based TOPSIS model is built to illustrate the features of multiple criteria and the relations among 187 
alternatives (i.e. strategies), so as to select the best-fit strategies for accident prevention. 188 
3.1 Statistical analysis of risk factors and strategy formulation 189 
The risk factors contributing to human errors are selected from the investigation of 161 reports involving 208 190 
vessels and thresholding according to the probability of occurrence in case of data distortion (Wan et al., 2017; 191 
Wang and Yang, 2018). The data is obtained from the case-by-case analysis of recorded maritime accidents 192 
from the Maritime Accident Investigation Branch (MAIB), and the Transportation Safety Board of Canada 193 
(TSB) that occurred from 2012 to 2017. MCA is performed to detect patterns of risk factors explaining 194 
accidents. Then it is completed with a Hierarchical Clustering, aiming at creating a Classification Tree. In this 195 
way, the strategies are formulated based on risk factors analysis from the above investigation. 196 
There is a discussion that accident prevention strategies should focus on reforming the system by systematic 197 
thinking approaches rather than on fixing the broken poles. Although little guidance exists on how to translate 198 
incident data into accident prevention strategies that address the systematic causes of accidents (Goode et al., 199 
2016), it has been a feasible approach to develop strategies by the statistical analyses of accidents or incidents. 200 
This study generates strategies for accident prevention based on the contributory factors analysis by 201 
conducting MCA associated with HC and CT. Such statistical analysis considers the patterns of causation 202 
 
 
factors so as to reveal the rational generation of strategies. 203 
MCA is a geometric data analysis method that explains the structure hidden in a data set for categorical data, 204 
which is the counterpart of Principal Component Analysis. It can represent data as points in low-dimensional 205 
Euclidean spaces, particularly applicable for a moderate number of individuals and a significant number of 206 
variables (Burt, 1950; Chauvin et al., 2013). Hierarchical Clustering is a clustering approach that classifies 207 
individuals in a hierarchy of clusters, while Classification Tree learning is a data mining method that uses 208 
input variables to predict the class to which the data belong (Hastie et al., 2005; Chauvin et al., 2013).  209 
The above analyses presented are conducted using the R packages FactoMineR. It generated the criteria of 210 
maritime accidents in the form of accident types and the strategies for the countermeasures derived from above 211 
categorical data. 212 
3.2 A BN-based approach to reveal interrelations among strategies  213 
In order to facilitate the modelling of the relations among strategies, BN is applied into the analysis of the 214 
maritime accident types under various risk factors. The data is obtained from the case-by-case analysis of 215 
recorded maritime accidents, and the risk factors in BN are from both maritime accident reports and the 216 
literature (Chauvin et al., 2013; Graziano et al., 2014; Kum and Sahin, 2015).  217 
Human factors in maritime accidents are usually combined with other external factors, such as sea condition, 218 
weather condition, fairway traffic, and vessel condition that affect the safety procedure in navigation. From 219 
this perspective, it is beneficial to combine human factors with such external factors to investigate their 220 
combined effect on maritime safety. Therefore, the common factors with frequencies higher than average value, 221 
 
 
19.35%, combined with the factors identified from the literature (Wang and Yang, 2018), encompass a 222 
collection of 25 risk factors, as present in Table 1. Most of the definitions of variables’ states can be extracted 223 
from accident investigation reports from MAIB or TSB, including ‘accident type’, ‘ship type’, ‘hull type’, 224 
‘ship operation’, and ‘voyage segment’. Some variables are degraded according to the literature (Wang and 225 
Yang, 2018), including ‘ship age’, ‘length’, and ‘gross tonnage’. Then, ‘vessel condition’, ‘communication’, 226 
‘supervision’, etcetera, are grading based on whether it is blamed for the faults in accidents, as data 227 
characteristic described in the reports. In addition, accident types are present in Table 2. 228 
Table 1 The risk factors identified from the literature and accident reports  229 
Source RFs Notation Description and corresponding values in BN 
Weng and Yang 
(2015) 
Ship type 𝑅𝑆𝑇 
Passenger vessel (1), tug (2), barge (3), fishing vessel (4), container ship (5), bulk 
carrier (6), RORO (7), tanker or chemical ship (8), cargo ship (9), others (10). 
Balmat et al. 
(2009) 
Hull type 𝑅𝐻𝑇 Steel (1), wood (2), aluminium (4), others (5) 
Zhang et al. 
(2013)  
Ship age (years) 𝑅𝑆𝐴 (0 5] (1), [6 10] (2), [11 15] (3), [16 20] (4), >20 (5), NA (6) 
MAIB19-2017, 
TSBM16P0362 
Length (m) 𝑅𝐿 ≤100 (1), >100 (2), NA (3) 




𝑅𝐺𝑇 ≤300 (1), 300 to 10000 (2), >10000 (3), NA (4) 
MAIB19-2017 Ship operation 𝑅𝑆𝑂 
Towing (1), Loading/unloading (2), Pilotage (3), Manoeuvring (4), Fishing (5), 
At anchor (6), On passage (7), others (8) 
MAIB19-2017 Voyage segment 𝑅𝑉𝑆 In port (1), Departure (2), Arrival (3), Mid-water (4), Transit (5), others (6) 
Balmat et al. 
(2011) 
Ship speed 𝑅𝑆𝑆 Normal (1), fast (2)  
MAIB23-2017 Vessel condition 𝑅𝑣𝑐 
The condition of vessel has nothing to do with the accidents (1); 
Increasing complexity of propulsion arrangements, modification made to vessels, 




Devices and equipment onboard operate correctly (1); 
Devices and equipment not fully utilised or operated correctly (e.g., Bridge 
Navigational Watch & Alarm System (BNWAS) switched off, alarm system not 
in the recommended position or not noticed) (2) 
TSBM16P0362 Ergonomic design 𝑅𝐸𝐷 
Ergonomic friendly or ergonomic aspects have nothing to do with accidents (1); 
Ergonomic impact of innovative bridge design (e.g., visual blind sector ahead, 
 
 
motion illusion) (2) 
TSBM16P0362 Information 𝑅𝐼 
Effective and updated information provided (1); 
Insufficient or lack of updated information (e.g., poor quality of equipment data, 
falsified records of information, relies on a single piece of navigational 
equipment, without working indicators or light for necessary observing) (2) 
MAIB8-2013 Weather condition 𝑅𝑊𝐶 Good (1)/poor (2) considering rain, wind, fog, visibility 
MAIB22-2017 Sea condition 𝑅𝑆𝐶 Good (1)/poor (2) considering falling/rising tide, current, waves 
MAIB22-2017 Time of day 𝑅𝑇𝐷 07:00 to 19:00 (1), other (2) 
MAIB23-2017 Fairway traffic 𝑅𝐹𝑇 
Good (1) or poor (2) considering complex geographic environment, dense traffic, 
or receptive nature of the route contributing to ignorance 
MAIB 25-2017 Communication A1 Good (1) or poor (2) communication and coordination  
MAIB 24-2017 Supervision A2 
Effective (1) or ineffective (2) supervision and supports  
(lone watchkeeper or working isolated, improper supervision of loading 
operation) 
MAIB 23-2017 Clear order A6 
Good (1) or unclear (2) order from documents 
(not accurately interpret and apply the requirements of a safe manning document) 
MAIB 20-2017 Experienced A11 
Familiar (1) or unfamiliar (2) with/lack of equipment knowledge, experienced or 
inexperienced, good or ill-prepared; 
MAIB 22-2017 Complacent A12 
Properly understand (1) or complacent about (2) the duties/underestimation of the 
severity of the condition (low state of alertness) 
MAIB 26-2017 Regulation A18 
Good (1) or inappropriate/ambiguous (2) code, endorsement, regulations, 
procedure, instructions, formal published guidance; operation manual, 
requirement 
MAIB 14-2015 Risk assessment A19 Good (1) or lack of (2) risk assessment 
MAIB 14-2017 Management A20 
Good (1) or dysfunctional (2) management system  
(including shore management, maintenance management, bridge source 
management, onboard management, safety management systems, port service, 
qualification examination, inadequate training, practice, emergency drill) 
MAIB 17-2017 Safety culture A21 Good (1) or lack of (2) safety culture, precautionary thought 
 230 
Table 2 Accident type identification 231 












A data-driven method, Tree Augmented Network (TAN), which relies on the learning algorithm in the BN 232 
model, was developed to generate BN structure and CPTs calculation by Netica software package (Norsys, 233 
http://www.norsys.com ). After sensitivity analysis, this model was used to illustrate the relations among the 234 
strategies, and provide the intersection of strategies under various criteria by adjusting the BN.  235 
From this point of view, the strategies derived from Section 3.1 are revealed as risk factors with multiple states 236 
in the BN. By giving state to the risk factors in BN, the strategies are assumed to be given, the findings of the 237 
node of accident types are revealed as changeable values in the crisp values for the TOPSIS. The results of the 238 
networks are demonstrated in Figure 1.  239 
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Figure 1 presents the results of TAN involving all the retained 25 risk factors. Among the accidents, grounding 242 
and collision are among the most frequent accident types, accounting for 20.3% and 21.2%, respectively. In 243 
addition, the relationships among various factors are generated by this data-driven approach. By adjusting one 244 
state of the variable, the differences of the findings will be reflected in BN.  245 
3.3 TOPSIS for the formulation of accident prevention strategies  246 
In this section, TOPSIS method is applied to explaining the priorities among different strategies and the 247 
formulation of maritime accident prevention decisions. TOPSIS was proposed as an alternative to the 248 
ELECTRE method (Yoon, 1981; Yoon and Hwang, 1995), which was generated based on the idea that if an 249 
alternative has the shortest distance to the ideal solution within the Euclidean space (Streimikiene et al., 2012), 250 
and can be considered as the best one in the system. However, it is possible that such a solution that has the 251 
shortest Euclidean distance to the ideal solution also has a shorter distance to the negative ideal solution (Tzeng 252 
et al., 2002). Therefore, the TOPSIS method considers both the above distances. Moreover, modified TOPSIS 253 
method utilised the ‘city block distance’ (Yoon and Hwang, 1995) instead of the Euclidean distance, so that 254 
any solution that has the shortest distance to the positive ideal solution (PIS) can be guaranteed to have the 255 
farthest distance to the negative ideal solution (NIS) (Tzeng et al., 2002).  256 
In this study, the nine states of accident types are treated as multiple criteria, and the strategies selected by 257 
statistical analysis are as alternatives in the TOPSIS. The procedures of TOPSIS include the following steps. 258 
Step 1: Based on the crisp values obtained from BN model, an evaluation matrix consisting m alternatives and 259 
n criteria, where m= 9 representing nine strategies, n= 9 representing nine accident types is created, with the 260 
 
 
intersection of each alternative and criterion given as
ijX , therefore a matrix ij( )m nX  . Each intersection is 261 
obtained from each state value of the node of accident type in BN model developed in Section 3.2. 262 
Step 2: 
ij( )m nX   is normalised to form the matrix ( )ij m nR r  , using the following equation: 263 
2
1











  264 
In this way, the normalisation of the matrix for the performance of strategies is obtained. 265 
















1jj w    , and jW   is the original weight given to the criterion, representing initial 268 
correspondence value for the states of accident type in BN. That is to say, in this study, the weight of each 269 
criterion is given based on the occurrence probability of the accidents.  270 
Step 4: Determine the NIS A  and the PIS +A  . 271 
      
      +
max 1,2,..., , min 1,2,..., 1,2,..., ,
min 1,2,..., , max 1,2,..., 1,2,..., ,
ij ij wj
ij ij bj
A t i m j J t i m j J t j n




      
      
  272 
Where,  1,2,...,J J n    is associated with the criteria having a positive impact, and  1,2,...,J J n    273 
is associated with the criteria having a negative impact. However, the criteria including nine types of accidents 274 
proposed herein all have negative impact. 275 
 
 
Step 5: Calculate the Euclidean distance (commonly in most applications) measurements between target 276 





, 1,2,..., , 1,2,..., ,ij jjS v v i m j n
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, 1,2,..., , 1,2,..., ,ij jjS v v i m j n
 

     280 
Where S   and +S  are the distance from the target alternative, i to the worst and best strategies, respectively. 281 
Step 6: Calculate the similarity to the worst condition, representing the performance of strategies.  282 








   

  283 
i 1C   if and only if the alternative solution has the best condition; and i 0C   if and only if the alternative 284 
solution has the worst condition. 285 
Step 7: Rank the strategies for maritime accident prevention according to the value of i ( 1,2,..., )C i m . 286 
4. Case study 287 
4.1 Maritime accident prevention strategy generation 288 
Based on the statistical analysis in Section 3.1, the top 14 risk factors are selected for MCA according to the 289 
frequency threshold value of 0.19, which is the average value among all frequencies. That is to say, the variable 290 
 
 
with a frequency larger than 0.19 is selected as one of the 14 risk factors, as shown in Table 3. 291 
Table 3 The frequencies of risk factors selected for MCA 292 








Sea_condition falling tide, current, waves 111 97 53.3654 
Information insufficient or lack of updated information (poor 
quality of equipment data, falsified records of 
information, relies on a single piece of navigational 
equipment); no automatic means or without indicators 
for necessary observing (working indicators, light) 
95 113 45.6731 
A20 dysfunctional management system (shore 
management, maintenance management, bridge 
source management, on board management, safety 
management systems, port service, qualification 
examination, inadequate training, practice, emergency 
drill) 
85 123 40.8654 
Weather_condition wind, visibility(dense fog) 82 126 39.4231 
Equipment 
/device 
devices and equipment on board not fully utilised or 
operated correctly (BNWAS switched off, alarm 
system not in the recommended position or not 
noticed) 
79 129 37.9808 
A6 no clear order (not accurately interpret and apply the 
requirements of a safe manning document) 
78 130 37.5000 
A2 ineffective supervision and supports (lone 
watchkeeper or working isolated, improper 
supervision of loading operation) 
68 140 32.6923 
A11 unfamiliar with/lack of equipment knowledge, 
inexperienced, ill-prepared 
68 140 32.6923 
A1 poor communication and coordination with team 64 144 30.7692 
Vessel_condition the poor condition of the vessel, the increasing 
complexity of propulsion arrangements, and 
modifications made to vessels, size 
60 148 28.8462 
 
 
A19 lack of risk assessment 56 152 26.9231 
A21 lack of safety culture, precautionary thought 51 157 24.5192 
A12 complacent about the duties or underestimation of the 
severity of the condition (low state of alertness) 
45 163 21.6346 
A18 inappropriate or ambiguous code, endorsement, 
regulations, procedure, instructions, formal published 
guidance; operation manual, requirement 
41 167 19.7115 
In order to point out patterns of contributory factors (Chauvin et al., 2013), these risk factors are employed 293 
into MCA (see Figure 2). 294 
Axis 1 explains 12.01% of the inertia. It is determined by attributes Information (no), weather_condition (no), 295 
sea_condition (no), A18 (no). It opposes: 296 
 The modalities: Information (no), weather_condition (no), sea_condition (no), A18 (no), on the positive 297 
side, to 298 
 The opposite modalities on the negative side. 299 
As far as individual vessels are concerned, it opposes: 300 
 Vessels experiencing an accident without sufficient information, in poor condition of sea and weather, 301 
having problems with ambiguous code, endorsement, regulations, procedure, or instructions, to 302 
 Vessels experiencing an accident the opposite conditions. 303 
This axis quantifies the intensity of environmental and management problems.  304 
 
 
Axis 2 explains 10.33% of the inertia. It is determined by attributes A19 (no), A11 (no), A2 (no), Equipment 305 
(yes). It opposes: 306 
 The modalities: A19 (no), A11 (no), A2 (no), Equipment (yes), on the positive side, to 307 
 The opposite modalities on the negative side. 308 
As far as individual vessels are concerned, it opposes: 309 
 Vessels experiencing an accident without risk assessment, where seafarers are ill-prepared or 310 
inexperienced for the navigation, without enough supervision or working isolated, with equipment 311 
operating properly, to 312 
 Vessels which are experiencing an accident with sufficient risk assessment, where experienced seafarers 313 
had enough equipment knowledge and are well-prepared, with effective supervision and supports, where 314 
devices and equipment on board are not fully utilised or operated correctly. 315 




Figure 2. MCA factor map for contributory factors 318 
Then, hierarchical clustering is carried out from the coordinates of individuals on all the axes. The analysis 319 
shows three different classes of cases, as shown in Figure 3. Associated with a classification tree (see Figure. 320 
4), it shows the variables that best explain vessel allocation to the different classes among the above factors, 321 
which is helpful for the generation of strategies. Each tree distinguishes a class, where there are three classes. 322 
The left side of each branch corresponds to a “yes” to the question in the root, whereas the right side 323 
corresponds to a “no”. Under each leaf, the class type and percentages of elements of each class in the leaf 324 
appear; the first line ‘1’ means first class and .23/.67/.10 means that there are 23% of accidents belonging to 325 
the first class, 67% of accidents belonging to the second class and 10% of accidents of the third class. The 326 
 
 
presence of weather condition appears to be a characteristic of the first class, which means many accidents are 327 
caused by rain, wind, fog, or poor visibility. Moreover, weather condition factor is always associated with a 328 
lack of safety culture, poor sea condition, unclear order, and dysfunctional management system. Class 1 is 329 
well characterised by lack of safety culture, and integration of poor sea condition and unclear order. Class 2 330 
is revealed to be connected with weather condition or sea condition, which is less affected by human factors. 331 
Class 3 is reasonably characterised by the dysfunctional management system. 332 
  333 
















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 4 Classification tree for variables explaining vessel allocation to different classes 336 
Figure 4 illustrates the significant factors and the combination of them which classify the accidents. By doing 337 
this, such factors can be selected to support generating strategies for maritime accident prevention. There are 338 
strategies derived from the above results considering human factors. It should be noted that although weather 339 
and sea condition are significant factors from the statistical analysis, it reveals less information for the accident 340 
prevention countermeasures. Therefore, attention is given to factors associated with such environmental 341 
factors so as to propose the strategies to solve the safety issues.  342 
(1) A21 (Safety culture): vessels should keep and maintain a good safety culture, and seafarers onboard should 343 
have precautionary thought. 344 
 
 
(2) A6 (Clear order): good and clear order from documents is supposed to be accurately interpreted, and the 345 
requirements of a safe manning document should be applied. 346 
(3) A20 (Management): appropriate management system should include shore management, maintenance 347 
management, bridge source management, onboard management, safety management systems, port service, 348 
qualification examination, inadequate training, practice, emergency drill. 349 
(4) Information: sufficient and updated information should be provided; any insufficient or lack of updated 350 
information (e.g., poor quality of equipment data, falsified records of information, relies on a single piece of 351 
navigational equipment, without working indicators or light for necessary observing) should be avoided.  352 
(5) A18 (Regulation): appropriate code, endorsement, regulations, procedure, instructions, formally 353 
published guidance, operation manual, requirement are required, and any ambiguous documents should be 354 
revised. 355 
(6) A19 (Risk assessment): ship owners and ship authorities should keep enough risk assessment for the ship 356 
and crews. 357 
(7) A11 (Experienced): crews should be familiar with equipment knowledge; experienced and well-prepared 358 
seafarers are required. 359 
(8) A2 (Supervision): adequate supervision and supports should be given when on duty, and lone watchkeeper 360 
or working isolated, improper supervision of loading operation should be eliminated. 361 
(9) Equipment: devices and equipment onboard should be operated correctly before the voyage; any 362 
 
 
circumstances for problematic equipment (e.g., Bridge Navigational Watch & Alarm System (BNWAS) 363 
switched off, alarm system not in the recommended position or not noticed) should be eliminated.  364 
4.2 Calculation of TOPSIS matrices derived from BN 365 
Each accident type is seen as a criterion for the multiple criteria decision making. According to the BN 366 
structure and results in Section 3.2, the weight of each criterion was given based on the probability of 367 
occurrence of the accidents, which is revealed as initial correspondence value for the state of accident type in 368 
BN. Moreover, the evaluation matrix consisting of nine alternatives and nine attributes, with the intersection 369 
of each alternative and criterion was given in Table 4, which generated step 1 of the TOPSIS method, where 370 
S1-S9 represent different types of accidents. 371 
Table 4 Create an evaluation matrix for 9 alternatives and 9 attributes 372 
Weight 0.203 0.212 0.037 0.055 0.111 0.106 0.042 0.092 0.143 
 S1 S2 S3 S4 S5 S6 S7 S8 S9 
A21 0.214  0.235  0.026  0.045  0.104  0.117  0.030  0.069  0.161  
A6 0.230  0.205  0.033  0.052  0.105  0.102  0.034  0.102  0.136  
A20 0.221  0.228  0.029  0.041  0.114  0.107  0.039  0.085  0.137  
Information 0.218  0.158  0.033  0.062  0.132  0.073  0.043  0.106  0.176  
A18 0.202  0.226  0.042  0.055  0.114  0.079  0.037  0.101  0.143  
A19 0.238  0.221  0.034  0.048  0.092  0.107  0.038  0.087  0.136  
A11 0.211  0.231  0.032  0.048  0.082  0.109  0.039  0.091  0.156  
A2 0.186  0.217  0.035  0.056  0.112  0.100  0.042  0.093  0.159  
Equipment 0.215  0.193  0.036  0.056  0.108  0.106  0.033  0.103  0.150  
With regards to the intersection of each alternative and criterion, crisp values in TOPSIS are generated from 373 
BN rather than the fuzzy environment or vague information, which utilises the advantages of the data-driven 374 
approach of BN accounting for the inter-relations among criteria. To be specific, this step overcomes the 375 
drawback of the TOPSIS method, considering the interaction among strategies in BN model, which is more 376 
 
 
rational in the real word. Besides, the weight of each criterion is determined by the initial probabilities of 377 
accident types, which implies that accident type with higher probability accounts for higher weight for MCDM. 378 
4.3 Maritime accident prevention strategy selection 379 
In order to obtain the normalised matrix, calculations have been conducted to generate Table 5, where S1-S9 380 
represent different types of accidents. 381 
Table 5 The normalised matrix for the performance of strategies 382 
 S1 S2 S3 S4 S5 S6 S7 S8 S9 
A21 0.331  0.366  0.258  0.290  0.321  0.386  0.267  0.246  0.355  
A6 0.356  0.319  0.327  0.335  0.325  0.337  0.303  0.363  0.300  
A20 0.342  0.355  0.288  0.264  0.352  0.353  0.347  0.303  0.302  
Information 0.337  0.246  0.327  0.399  0.408  0.241  0.383  0.377  0.389  
A18 0.312  0.352  0.417  0.354  0.352  0.261  0.329  0.359  0.316  
A19 0.368  0.344  0.337  0.309  0.284  0.353  0.338  0.310  0.300  
A11 0.326  0.360  0.317  0.309  0.253  0.360  0.347  0.324  0.344  
A2 0.288  0.338  0.347  0.360  0.346  0.330  0.374  0.331  0.351  
Equipment 0.333  0.301  0.357  0.360  0.334  0.350  0.294  0.367  0.331  
 383 
Then weighted normalised matrix is obtained, followed by calculating the ideal best and ideal worst values. 384 
After that, the Euclidean distances from the ideal best solution and the ideal worst solution are calculated by 385 
the equations in Section 3.3. At last, TOPSIS calculates the performance score and ranks the strategies, which 386 
is shown in Table 6.  387 
Table 6 Calculation of performance score and the rank of strategies 388 
 S1 S2 S3 S4 S5 S6 S7 S8 S9 Si+ Si- Ci Rank 
A21 0.067  0.068  0.012  0.018  0.036  0.036  0.013  0.033  0.043  0.023  0.020  0.475  3  
 
 
A6 0.072  0.052  0.012  0.022  0.045  0.026  0.016  0.035  0.056  0.027  0.028  0.506  2  
A20 0.069  0.075  0.015  0.019  0.039  0.028  0.014  0.033  0.045  0.028  0.017  0.381  9  
Information 0.068  0.052  0.012  0.022  0.045  0.026  0.016  0.035  0.056  0.025  0.028  0.528  1  
A18 0.063  0.075  0.015  0.019  0.039  0.028  0.014  0.033  0.045  0.027  0.020  0.430  6  
A19 0.075  0.073  0.012  0.017  0.032  0.037  0.014  0.028  0.043  0.029  0.021  0.416  8  
A11 0.066  0.076  0.012  0.017  0.028  0.038  0.015  0.030  0.049  0.029  0.022  0.427  7  
A2 0.058  0.072  0.013  0.020  0.038  0.035  0.016  0.030  0.050  0.026  0.020  0.440  5  
Equipment 0.068  0.064  0.013  0.020  0.037  0.037  0.012  0.034  0.047  0.023  0.021  0.473  4  
A+ 0.058  0.052  0.012  0.017  0.028  0.026  0.012  0.028  0.043      
A- 0.075  0.076  0.015  0.022  0.045  0.038  0.016  0.035  0.056      
From this table, it is evidence that strategies about equipment, information, and clear order are the top three 389 
recommendations for maritime accident prevention considering human factors. To be specific, these strategies 390 
are as follows. 391 
 (1) Effective and updated information should be provided. Any insufficient or lack of updated information 392 
(e.g., poor quality of equipment data, falsified records of information, relies on a single piece of navigational 393 
equipment, without working indicators or light for necessary observing) should be avoided. 394 
(2) Good and clear order from documents is supposed to be accurately interpreted, and the requirements of a 395 
safe manning document should be applied. 396 
(3) Vessels should keep and maintain a good safety culture, and seafarers onboard should have precautionary 397 
thought. 398 
Besides, the first strategy about equipment shows most prospects among all strategies, based on the 399 
comparison of Ci values. These values represent the similarity to the worst condition, which are used as the 400 
indicators for strategy ranking, as demonstrated in Section 3.3. It can be seen from Table 6 that Ci (0.528) of 401 
‘Information’ which ranks first, indicates significant performance in order to prevent accidents, compared to 402 
 
 
the second or other strategies. 403 
4.4 Model evaluation 404 
4.4.1 Sensitivity analysis 405 
To validate the model, it is examined by testing the combined effect of multiple RIFs to the accident types in 406 
BN model, because it contributes crisp values into TOPSIS matrix. 407 
According to the literature, there are two axioms to be satisfied in the sensitivity analysis (Fan et al., 2020). 408 
For example, the ‘information’ in Figure 1 is selected as the first node, the state generating the highest changed 409 
value of ‘collision’ (S1) in ‘accident type’ is increased by 10%, while the state generating the lowest changed 410 
value of ‘collision’ in ‘accident type’ is decreased by 10%. This procedure is written as ‘~10%’. And the same 411 
approach is applied to the next RIF ‘vessel condition’, and the integrated changed value is obtained and 412 
updated. From Table 7, the updated values of ‘S1’are gradually increasing when more RIFs are included. 413 
Similarly, the same updating procedures are applied into the state 2, 3… 9 in ‘accident type’ respectively, until 414 
all states are included. In this way, the updated values of the target node are gradually increasing or decreasing 415 
along with the continuously changing RIFs, so that two axioms are examined. 416 
Table 7 Accident rate of minor change in RIFs 417 
Information / ~10% ~10% ~10% ~10% ~10% 
Vessel condition / / ~10% ~10% ~10% ~10% 
Voyage segment / / / ~10% ~10% ~10% 
Ship operation / / / / ~10% ~10% 
Ship age / / / / / ~10% 
S1 20.3 20.4 21.2 21.5 22 22.2 
 
 
4.4.2 Reliability test for TOPSIS 418 
The reliability test for BN-based TOPSIS method is conducted by adjusting the human factors, which includes 419 
more strategies in the model to observe updated results of the ranking. Firstly, the less important human factor 420 
A12 has been added into maritime accident prevention strategies, which formulates a new evaluation matrix 421 
for 10 alternatives and 9 attributes, shown in Table 8. The 10th alternative represent the strategy A12：The 422 
duties and the severity of the condition should be appropriately estimated with enough alertness. 423 
Table 8 New evaluation matrix for 10 alternatives and 9 attributes (after adding A12) 424 
Weight 0.203 0.212 0.037 0.055 0.111 0.106 0.042 0.092 0.143 
 S1 S2 S3 S4 S5 S6 S7 S8 S9 
A21 0.214  0.235  0.026  0.045  0.104  0.117  0.030  0.069  0.161  
A6 0.230  0.205  0.033  0.052  0.105  0.102  0.034  0.102  0.136  
A20 0.221  0.228  0.029  0.041  0.114  0.107  0.039  0.085  0.137  
Information 0.218  0.158  0.033  0.062  0.132  0.073  0.043  0.106  0.176  
A18 0.202  0.226  0.042  0.055  0.114  0.079  0.037  0.101  0.143  
A19 0.238  0.221  0.034  0.048  0.092  0.107  0.038  0.087  0.136  
A11 0.211  0.231  0.032  0.048  0.082  0.109  0.039  0.091  0.156  
A2 0.186  0.217  0.035  0.056  0.112  0.100  0.042  0.093  0.159  
Equipment 0.215  0.193  0.036  0.056  0.108  0.106  0.033  0.103  0.150  
A12 0.179  0.241  0.043  0.064  0.118  0.089  0.044  0.098  0.125  
Secondly, the corresponding weighted normalised matrix, Euclidean distances from the ideal best and ideal 425 
worst have changed accordingly. At last, the performance score and the strategies ranking are found in Table 426 
9. 427 
Table 9 Performance score and strategy ranking after adding A12 428 
 S1 S2 S3 S4 S5 S6 S7 S8 S9 Si+ Si- Ci Rank 
A21 0.067  0.068  0.012  0.018  0.036  0.036  0.013  0.033  0.043  0.023  0.020  0.475  3  
A6 0.072  0.052  0.012  0.022  0.045  0.026  0.016  0.035  0.056  0.027  0.028  0.506  2  
A20 0.069  0.075  0.015  0.019  0.039  0.028  0.014  0.033  0.045  0.028  0.017  0.381  9  
 
 
Information 0.068  0.052  0.012  0.022  0.045  0.026  0.016  0.035  0.056  0.025  0.028  0.528  1  
A18 0.063  0.075  0.015  0.019  0.039  0.028  0.014  0.033  0.045  0.027  0.020  0.430  6  
A19 0.075  0.073  0.012  0.017  0.032  0.037  0.014  0.028  0.043  0.029  0.021  0.416  8  
A11 0.066  0.076  0.012  0.017  0.028  0.038  0.015  0.030  0.049  0.029  0.022  0.427  7  
A2 0.058  0.072  0.013  0.020  0.038  0.035  0.016  0.030  0.050  0.026  0.020  0.440  5  
Equipment 0.068  0.064  0.013  0.020  0.037  0.037  0.012  0.034  0.047  0.023  0.021  0.473  4  
A12 0.054  0.075  0.015  0.021  0.038  0.030  0.015  0.030  0.038  0.119  0.025  0.175  10 
A+ 0.058  0.052  0.012  0.017  0.028  0.026  0.012  0.028  0.043      
A- 0.075  0.076  0.015  0.022  0.045  0.038  0.016  0.035  0.056      
Compared to the results of Table 6, it is evidence that the input of strategy A12 does not influence the ranking 429 
of strategies in Section 4.3, although the values of Ci change slightly. In this way, it shows the reliability test 430 
of the above BN-based TOPSIS method.  431 
With regard to the results of BN-based TOPSIS model, it demonstrates the rational selection of alternatives, 432 
as well as the decision making of multiple criteria considering the relations among multiple strategies. 433 
Compared to the approach that proposed countermeasures by scenario simulation using BN (Yang et al., 2018), 434 
this method reveals some advantages. Although being able to reduce the probability of one state of the node 435 
by scenario simulation, BN cannot reflect the best scenario to reduce the overall probability of all accident 436 
types in this study by adjusting single factor or the combined factors. Therefore, TOPSIS method is applied 437 
into the final step for MCDM.  438 
Overall, this method overcomes the drawback of the BN method that cannot determine the best scenario in 439 
multiple criteria system and the disadvantage of TOPSIS method that cannot reflect the crisp value by 440 
considering the correlations among alternatives. The results present the ranking order of strategies in view of 441 
human factors, which illustrates strategies that should be taken priority for maritime accident prevention. 442 
 
 
5. Conclusion  443 
This study proposes an advanced methodology for human factors analysis and maritime accident prevention 444 
by incorporating BN and TOPSIS in the MCDM system. In order to generate the prevention strategies, it 445 
integrates MCA, HC and CT to generate alternatives for MCDM. MCA is performed to detect patterns of 446 
contributory factors explaining maritime accident types. It was also completed with HC, aiming at creating 447 
different classes of vessels, and a CT. Then, Bayesian-based TOPSIS model is built to illustrate the values of 448 
criteria and the relations among strategies for accident prevention. Specifically, TOPSIS is adopted for the 449 
strategies selection to generate new insights for accident prevention recommendations for transport authorities 450 
given human factors.  451 
The results convey that strategies about information, clear order, and safety culture are the top three 452 
recommendations for maritime accident prevention considering human factors. In order to prevent accidents 453 
related to human factors, these strategies should be developed with higher priority to provide insights for the 454 
improvement of maritime safety. From these perspectives, transport authorities obtain insights from past 455 
accidents to generate significant strategies for accident prevention. Moreover, it would contribute to the 456 
accident investigation and human factors research in the maritime field to provide effective strategies or 457 
recommendations for the maritime industry and policymakers. 458 
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